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THE SUPREME COURT AND  
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
JOSEPH D. KEARNEY* 
This is a great privilege.  I never would have expected to be on this 
side of the podium for the Pallium Lecture.   
Tonight’s topic is the Supreme Court and religious liberty.  It is along 
the lines of what Archbishop Jerome Listecki suggested (and we Chicago 
White Sox fans have to support one another).  So let’s get right into it.  
After all, we have only a little more than an hour together—or fifty 
minutes or so on my account, and as much time thereafter as the good 
judgment of the moderator, John Rothstein, supports.   
We must start with the fact that the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides for religious liberty.  It is not the only 
guarantee of religious liberty, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States is not the only entity with authority on some questions of religious 
liberty.  Those are related points.  On the first point, almost every state 
has, in its own constitution, an analogue to the First Amendment, though 
sometimes speaking in notably different terms.  For example, just to give 
you a local flavor, Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
begins as follows: “The right of every person to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall 
any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, 
or to maintain any ministry, without consent . . . .”  And it goes on from 
there.  Thus, on my second point of a moment ago, state supreme courts 
have authority to protect against interferences with religious liberty by 
state and local governments.  Additional complications arise because 
legislative bodies are capable of granting rights as well as interfering with 
rights.  This is a point to which we shall have to return before we are 
finished. 
Yet I think it quite justifiable to focus the bulk of our attention on the 
Supreme Court and the First Amendment.  First, the Court has the final 
authority to interpret, where a case presents the question, the First 
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Amendment.  It has that authority because it announced as much in 1803 
in Marbury v. Madison1—surely the most important case that the Court 
ever decided.  This was not, of course, a case involving religious liberty 
(Mr. Marbury had no claim of religious entitlement to receive the 
commission as justice of the peace that President Adams had signed at 
figuratively midnight before his departure from office).  But the reference 
to Marbury is worthwhile not simply because, as Tom Shriner and I 
emphasize in our Federal Courts class, one referring to Marbury v. 
Madison feels important (as should one hearing the reference, by the 
way).  It’s worthwhile because, given Marbury and its use over the years, 
the Supreme Court’s supremacy in constitutional pronouncements now is 
an established fact or convention.  So while a state or Congress may 
provide additional liberty, the First Amendment as interpreted by the 
Court provides a baseline—a floor—below which no government entity 
may go.  Second, in terms of justifying our focus, let us not forget that our 
primary identification as citizens is overwhelmingly with the national 
government, not the state.  We are Americans.  This was not always so, 
of course—consider our pre-Civil War forebears—but there is no doubt 
about it now.  In short, when we think of religious liberty and legal rights, 
as with so many other things, we think especially of federal protections—
which means that we think especially of the First Amendment and of the 
Supreme Court. 
So on to the First Amendment, which says: “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .”  What has the Supreme Court done with this?  The 
Court and the Amendment have been with us for a while—225 years, give 
or take a year in the different instances—and it is useful to divide the 
Court’s work into three eras.  These are not of equal length (the first era 
would last into the 1960s) and are not watertight compartments.  But it is 
a useful framing device (he says hopefully).   
To begin, for a long time—almost a century—the Court did very little 
with the First Amendment.  How could that be?  Well, recall that it speaks 
in terms of federal power—Congress shall make no law.  That limited 
reach meant that there was little for the United States Supreme Court to 
do.  Yet there was one nineteenth-century case of note: Reynolds v. 
United States,2 decided in 1879.  Reynolds had been convicted in a federal 
court of bigamy, which federal law proscribed in the Utah territory (Utah 
was not yet a state, hence the applicability of federal law).  He contended 
 
1.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2.  98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
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that this violated his First Amendment rights.  The contention did not get 
him far.  The Court unanimously held that Reynolds had been subject to 
legal sanction not for his religious belief but for criminal activity; the First 
Amendment protected the former but not the latter.  The Court said that 
“those who make polygamy a part of their religion” cannot be “excepted 
from the operation of the statute.”3  Laws “cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, [but] they may with practices,” the Court 
went on, whether bigamy, human sacrifice, or suicide.4  The Reynolds case 
reflects the first era’s reigning principle: specifically, that the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause provides no exemption from laws of 
general applicability.  The case is a touchstone to which we will return.   
What happened to end this first era?  Well, an awful lot had to occur, 
as the era did not end for more than another 80 years.  So there is a lot 
for us to unpack in the era itself.  For a most important, threshold matter, 
the Civil War happened.  Or, more precisely, after the war, in 1868, the 
people of the United States adopted the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.  Or, more precisely yet, that amendment eventually was 
held to apply, against the states, most of the same restrictions applied 
under the Bill of Rights to the federal government.  This is the so-called 
incorporation doctrine, well known to any lawyers and a number of others 
here, I am sure.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s protections were held to 
include the First Amendment’s guarantees, and it therefore no longer 
mattered that the earlier amendment spoke in terms of things that 
Congress might not do.  The First Amendment’s prohibitions now applied 
to the states as well.  
Before we discuss some of the cases in and around the time of 
incorporation, let’s be clear that we understand the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.  I make no suggestion that nothing happened 
during this time affecting religious liberty.  Indeed, it was a rich era.  If 
you stretch its time boundaries a little bit, it included Virginia’s Statute 
for Religious Freedom (written by Thomas Jefferson) and James 
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments—in fact, these 1770s and 1780s matters preceded the First 
Amendment by a few years.  The time period also saw the 
disestablishment of various Protestant churches—that is, their separation 
from the state governments that had supported them—with the last of 
these occurring in Massachusetts in 1833.  And, much later (in the 1870s), 
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it saw the so-called Blaine Amendments, which changed various state 
constitutions to ban government support of seminaries or church schools.   
But the salient point for us is that the Supreme Court had little to do 
with developments around religious freedom.  This may seem a long time 
ago, and in many respects it was, but it is striking to note that, for more 
than half our history, religious liberty was a matter that simply was not a 
notable portion of the Supreme Court’s work. 
Nor did even incorporation end the first era—or at least not right 
away.  Yet in the same general timeframe as incorporation—let us call it 
1925 to 1950—there were hints, however incomplete, of things to come.  
In this regard, we must discuss Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 an important 
case.  Pierce was a 1925 case involving a challenge to an Oregon law 
requiring children between eight and sixteen years old to attend school—
public school.  As a treatise coauthored by one of my colleagues, 
Professor Scott Idleman, has described it, “[t]his public school monopoly 
law was narrowly enacted by an electoral initiative led by an ignoble crew 
of nativists, Ku Klux Klanners, Scottish Rite Masons, and anti-
Catholics . . . .”6  But this crew proved no match for the sisters—the 
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, to be precise.   
The Supreme Court struck down Oregon’s law.  It did not invoke the 
First Amendment.  It relied on something rather more vague: the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—which prohibits states 
from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.  The Court indicated that there was a liberty interest in a parent’s or 
guardian’s right to decide how his or her children were to be educated.  
Let’s listen to its words:  
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think 
it entirely plain that the Act . . . unreasonably interferes with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.  As often heretofore 
pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be 
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some 
purpose within the competency of the State.7 
The Court went on to say that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the 
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
 
5.  268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
6.  BORIS I. BITTKER, SCOTT C. IDLEMAN & FRANK S. RAVITCH, RELIGION AND THE 
STATE IN AMERICAN LAW 751 (2015). 
7.  Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
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coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations.”8 
So it was liberty that formed the basis for the Court’s ruling in Pierce, 
but not specifically religious liberty; indeed, the key precedent had 
nothing to do with religious liberty.  In Meyer v. Nebraska,9 a couple of 
years before Pierce, the Court had struck down a 1919 state law requiring 
all grade-school education—public or private, including parochial—to be 
in the English language.  It was not enough to have won World War I, 
apparently; even afterwards, Nebraska’s statute, like laws elsewhere at 
the time, targeted German-language instruction.  In the brief opinion 
striking down that statute as unconstitutional, the Court invoked 
“liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment.10 
So these were Fourteenth Amendment concepts, but application of 
the First Amendment—that is, incorporation—was near at hand.  This 
was part of a gradual process, with different parts of the Bill of Rights 
being held to be incorporated in a series of cases over the years.  But 
within about two decades of Pierce—that is, by the time of Everson v. 
Board of Education,11 in 1947—the Court would say that the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment apply to the states. 
The cases in between are interesting and deserve discussion.  They 
include Cantwell v. Connecticut,12 a 1940 decision invalidating the 
conviction of three Jehovah’s Witnesses for distributing religious 
literature on the streets of New Haven (aggravating the Catholics in the 
neighborhood, by the way) and, in the process, soliciting contributions.  
This violated a law requiring solicitors of such funds to obtain a certificate 
of “approv[al]” from a state official.13  Murdock v. Pennsylvania14 in 1943 
struck down an ordinance that required solicitors to purchase a license 
from the local borough—at least striking it down as applied to one asking 
for contributions in exchange for religious books and pamphlets.  And 
that same year, the famous case of West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette15 held that children in a public school could not be required to 
salute the flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance. 
 
8.  Id. at 535. 
9.  262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
10.  Id. at 399, 400. 
11.  330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
12.  310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
13.  Id. at 302. 
14.  319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
15.  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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These cases all share an important characteristic.  It is not that they 
all involved Jehovah’s Witnesses, although that is true and even 
interesting.  The important point is that these were at least as much—
indeed, they seem to have been more—free-speech cases as (or than) 
free-exercise-of-religion cases.  This need not have been the case.  That 
is, under some conceptions, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause 
could have provided a sufficient basis for striking down laws whose effect 
was to prohibit distribution of religious literature or to require one to 
proceed against the dictates of one’s conscience by (for example) saluting 
the flag.  But the Court did not go that route. 
I have focused on free exercise cases because they go plainly to 
religious liberty.  That is, they typically involve some citizen’s defending 
himself against state action by claiming a First Amendment right.  Yet I 
should note that there were some important Establishment Clause cases 
along the way.  For example, in Everson, our 1947 case, the Court rejected 
a challenge to a New Jersey law whose effect was to reimburse parents 
variously providing public-bus transportation of their children to both 
public and private schools, including religious ones.  The case may have 
seemed a victory for Catholics, but it came at a cost.  The entire Court—
even those justices in the majority, which rejected the Establishment 
Clause challenge—thought especially significant in interpreting the First 
Amendment the controversies in 1770s and 1780s Virginia that had 
prompted Jefferson to draft Virginia’s statute for religious freedom and 
Madison to write his remonstrance against religious assessments.16  This 
has seemed unfortunate to many, not least because it enabled the Court 
to observe in the process that “the clause against establishment of religion 
by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and 
State.’”17  Indeed, it described that wall as “high and impregnable.”18  
Much criticism has been directed at this reasoning, especially as it has 
subsequently been used to sustain various Establishment Clause 
challenges—e.g., to the government display of various crèches or 
menorahs or the Ten Commandments (even as the Court has rejected 
some such challenges and thus upheld certain other displays).  Yet I am 
not spending much time on Establishment Clause cases because they 
generally involve the citizen’s complaining not about the government’s 
direct interference with his religious liberty but rather about its lack of 
 
16.  See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11–13; id. at 28–29, 31, 33–41, 63–72 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
17.  Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). 
18.  Id. at 18. 
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neutrality or its support of religion.  Those can be important complaints, 
but they are outside my focus here. 
So let us return to the Free Exercise Clause—secure in the knowledge 
from Everson that the religion clauses were incorporated and not even 
concerned that, despite the press of time this evening, we are still in the 
first era.  In these mid-twentieth-century circumstances, although we 
were living fully in an era of incorporation of the First Amendment, there 
was little basis for thinking that anything substantively had changed 
otherwise from the Reynolds era.  Indeed, as late as 1961, in Braunfeld v. 
Brown,19 the Court held that a Sunday-closing law did not violate the 
rights of Orthodox Jewish merchants who wanted to be closed on 
Saturday but open on Sunday.  It said that the law imposed only an 
indirect burden on the exercise of religion—that is, it did not make 
unlawful any religious practice itself.  Essentially, the approach of 
Reynolds (which the Court cited) prevailed in Braunfeld, and there was 
no meaningful scrutiny of this generally applicable law. 
One of the dissenters in Braunfeld was Justice William Brennan.  And 
only two years later Justice Brennan would command a majority of the 
Court for his views.  The case was Sherbert v. Verner,20 and it brings us—
at last—to the second era of the Supreme Court’s free exercise 
jurisprudence.  The underlying circumstances were hard to distinguish 
from Braunfeld.  Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was fired from her 
job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day in her 
religion.  The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied 
her benefits, finding unacceptable her religious justification for refusing 
Saturday work.  In finding a violation of Sherbert’s First Amendment 
rights, the Court engaged in a balancing of interests: It held that the state’s 
eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a 
significant burden on Sherbert’s ability to freely exercise her faith and 
that there was no compelling state interest that justified this. 
Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented in Sherbert.  He noted that 
the state law was one that the state supreme court had “uniformly 
applied.”21  He even was concerned that allowing an exception for 
Sherbert based on her religion amounted to a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  And he noted the incompatibility of the decision 
with Braunfeld, which only two years earlier had upheld the right of a 
state to prohibit businesses from being open and to provide for a day of 
 
19.  366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
20.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
21.  Id. at 419 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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rest on Sunday—without any balancing of the costs imposed on an 
individual citizen.  Justice Harlan was joined in dissent by Justice Byron 
White.  It might be interesting to note that the former would be gone a 
decade later when the Court decided Roe v. Wade,22 but the latter would 
find himself in dissent there as well. 
Let us leave aside any path from the restrictions on the government 
in Sherbert to such restrictions in Roe (it is an understatement that the 
cases are distinguishable, but I am right to be provocative here).  The 
important point emerging from Sherbert is that the Court might require 
an exception based on religion to a law or government rule, even where 
that law or rule was neutral and of general application.  That the First 
Amendment could require such an exception would become the hallmark 
of the Court’s second era of free exercise jurisprudence.  
And while it did not last nearly as long as the first, it was, 
unquestionably, an era.  Sherbert led to such decisions as Wisconsin v. 
Yoder.23  In defending against a criminal action, Amish parents 
challenged the Wisconsin compulsory-education law.  In 1972, the Court 
held that the First Amendment, as incorporated, prevented the state from 
requiring that Amish children remain in school past the eighth grade, 
until age sixteen.  The Court was most sympathetic, ruling that 
Wisconsin’s law violated the Amish parents’ free exercise rights. 
Let me return to being provocative.  It should not go unremarked that 
the timeframe that we have thus far discussed in this second era—the 
1960s and early 1970s—was one in which the Court was rather willing to 
recognize rights well beyond free exercise of religion.  Some of this 
involved other First Amendment rights—such as Cohen v. California,24 a 
1971 decision involving the defendant’s wearing a shirt with an obscenity 
concerning the Vietnam War draft.  But some of it also was less tied to 
the text of the Constitution, including such famous (and to some 
infamous) cases as Griswold v. Connecticut,25 which in 1965 found a 
constitutional right on the part of married couples to use birth control 
products, and Roe v. Wade, recognizing a constitutional right to abortion 
in 1973.  These rights were found not so much in the specific text of the 
Constitution as in a right of privacy emerging from the Constitution’s 
“emanations” and “penumbras” (to use words from Griswold).26  The key 
 
22.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
23.  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
24.  403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
25.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
26.  Id. at 484. 
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precedents in these decisions?  Well, it would be far afield to dig deeply 
into them, but it may be noted that in Griswold the Court could say, 
“[W]e reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and the Meyer cases.”27  You 
will recall those as our 1920s cases invalidating a state ban on German-
language instruction (Meyer) and a state requirement of public as 
opposed to religious education (Pierce).  It is a jurisprudential challenge 
to applaud the one set of cases while booing the other—not an impossible 
one, no doubt, but a challenge. 
In all events, given this, it should not come as a large surprise that the 
emergence of a different Supreme Court in the 1980s and beyond, with 
some (though never yet most) of its members intent on undoing Roe v. 
Wade, also brought with it less interest in maintaining the approach of 
Sherbert and Yoder.  This is not to suggest that Sherbert and Yoder were 
the entirety of the second era.  For example, in Thomas v. Review Board,28 
the Court in 1981 validated the free exercise rights of a Jehovah’s Witness 
who had quit his job after a transfer to a position that required that he 
build military equipment in violation of his religious tenets.  In 
overturning Indiana’s refusal to accord unemployment benefits, the 
Court said that “a person may not be compelled to choose between the 
exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise 
available public program.”29  Once again, the Court employed a balancing 
test that permitted exceptions to laws of general applicability for the 
individual religious needs of citizens.  It would still be doing so as late as 
1989—in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,30 a 
unanimous unemployment benefits case and a generation after Sherbert 
by conventional measures (although Justice Brennan was still on the 
Court).   
The era would soon end.  A year later, we entered into what can 
reasonably be termed a third era, although some would characterize it as 
a return to the first. 
The key decision is Employment Division v. Smith,31 from 1990.  It 
involved two Native Americans who worked as counselors for a private 
drug rehabilitation organization.  They ingested peyote—a drug that was 
hallucinogenic—as part of their religious ceremonies and were 
consequently fired.  The state denied their claim for unemployment 
 
27.  Id. at 483. 
28.  450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
29.  Id. at 716. 
30.  489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
31.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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compensation because the reason for their dismissal was considered 
work-related “misconduct.”32  The state supreme court concluded that 
this denial of benefits violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause.  The United States Supreme Court reversed: Justice Antonin 
Scalia spoke for the Court in ruling against the free exercise claim.  “We 
have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State 
is free to regulate.  On the contrary, the record of more than a century of 
our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”33  Scalia 
invoked Reynolds v. United States—you will recall that 1879 case 
upholding the conviction of a Mormon for bigamy. 
And he noted that “[t]he only decisions in which we have held that 
the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable 
law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise 
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the 
press . . . .”34  Hybrid situations, as Justice Scalia would term them—and 
let us pause for a moment to note that, on this front, he cited Cantwell 
and Murdock, some of our Jehovah’s Witnesses cases.  “[O]r,” the Court 
continued, cases that involved “the right of parents, acknowledged in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, to direct the education of their children,”35 and 
for this it invoked Yoder. 
Let us leave aside the other cases that Justice Scalia cited (for he 
certainly had to engage with Sherbert) and return to his language—the 
Court’s language: 
Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise 
prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not 
only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from 
governmental regulation.  We have never held that, and decline to 
do so now.  There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law 
represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the 
communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children 
in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since 
Reynolds plainly controls.  “Our cases do not at their farthest 
reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious 
 
32.  Id. at 874. 
33.  Id. at 878–79. 
34.  Id. at 881. 
35.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a 
democratic government.”36 
Smith was decided in Justice Brennan’s final months on the Court, 
concluding some 34 years of service, and it would find him in dissent, 
together with Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun. 
We continue to be in this third era of constitutional law that Smith 
ushered in.  The constitutional decisions that follow Smith, even where 
they have ruled for the citizen’s free exercise rights, have not involved 
some balancing test.  For example, in 1993, in Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,37 the Court ruled for the Santerian 
religious claimant, but that was a case of pretty well overt discrimination.  
Local ordinances aimed at the church’s practice of ritual animal sacrifice.  
The problem was that the ordinances contained so many exemptions for 
all sorts of animal killings that the only conduct to come within the scope 
of the law was this church’s ritual sacrifice.  Here we had a law that was 
neither neutral nor generally applicable, so Smith did not apply, and the 
city could not meet the compelling state interest requirement. 
There is little else by way of constitutional law in this third era.  How 
can this be?  And should I therefore declare my remarks concluded with 
respect to my topic and open it up to questions—or, better yet, simply sit 
down?  Well, it is not yet time to yield the floor.  For we have finished the 
story of the Supreme Court’s engagement with the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise Clause but not that of its grappling with religious freedom.  
The reason is that, shortly after Smith, the United States Congress got 
into the act and gave to citizens broader free exercise rights and to the 
courts the responsibility of protecting them.  Specifically, in 1993, 
Congress, with the concurrence of President Clinton, enacted RFRA: the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.38  There is no doubt as to its purpose: 
It was to vindicate Justice Brennan over Justice Scalia.  Well, that is to 
personalize it a little too much, I admit, but it was to reject Smith (Scalia’s 
opinion) and to enshrine Sherbert (Brennan’s).  That is what the 
Restoration portion of the Act’s title meant.  To put it in doctrinal terms 
(legal doctrine, not church doctrine), RFRA reinstated the strict scrutiny 
standard even for neutral and generally applicable laws.   
Let’s discuss that a bit.  RFRA lays down a general rule that 
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
 
36.  Id. at 882 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)). 
37.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
38.  Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012)). 
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religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability . . . .”39  Then it provides for the possibility of exceptions—
that is, circumstances in which the government can impose a substantial 
burden.  An exception will apply if the burden—the government 
obligation or regulation, say—“(1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.”40  That’s quite the different 
standard from Smith; in fact, it’s Sherbert.  It’s also unconstitutional, the 
Court said in 1997, insofar as its scope included (as Congress intended) 
actions of state and local governments within this standard.41  But let us 
not get lost in that 1997 decision, interesting as it was for other 
constitutional reasons (involving Congress’s ability, or inability, to go 
beyond the Supreme Court’s recognition of rights in enforcing the 
Constitution). 
I say that for two reasons: One is that RFRA itself continues to restrict 
or control the actions of the federal government.  That portion was not 
struck down in 1997, and its continued viability has subsequently been 
made clear by the Court.  This is a big deal because the federal 
government is a big deal: The federal government of today has become 
rather more a government of general jurisdiction than ever previously.  It 
is involved in protecting lands, issuing mandates about water and air, 
governing housing, and regulating employment, just to scratch the 
surface.  So there is a lot of federal government action for which federal 
law now requires accommodations based on religious liberty.  The other 
reason not to get lost in the 1997 decision striking down RFRA with 
respect to the states is that in 2000 Congress passed the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (or RLUIPA),42 which contains the 
same substantive standard for religious liberty as RFRA and applies to 
state and local governments but avoids the constitutional problem 
(largely by tying Congress’s restriction of state and local governments to 
those governments’ acceptance of federal funds).  And the result of this—
i.e., the combination of RFRA and RLUIPA—is that in the lower courts 
there has been a veritable explosion of successful religious liberty claims 
in the past decade and a half, well beyond (in my estimation) anything 
 
39.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). 
40.  Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
41.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
42.  Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000cc to 
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that we saw in the second era of First Amendment free exercise law, 
which Sherbert ushered in and Smith then sent packing.   
Something else has been at work also—a point that I have thus far 
avoided but that bears comment, even emphasis: One aspect of the Free 
Exercise Clause that the Court has expanded and maintained in its 
expanded version, and that seems to have made its way into the new 
statutes, is the meaning of the term “religion.”  Over the past 140 or so 
years (so roughly Reynolds forward), the Court has moved from a largely 
monotheistic view to a more broadly theistic view to an essentially 
spiritual, non-theistic (though not necessarily atheistic) approach to 
religion.  In 1981 (in Thomas), for example, the Court had the following 
to say:  
The determination of what is a “religious” belief or practice is 
more often than not a difficult and delicate task . . . .  However, 
the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial 
perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious 
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment 
protection.43   
The matter is complex, and I wish to bottom-line it: Even today, the reach 
of the Free Exercise Clause is broad, in terms of the range of beliefs 
covered under the rubric “religion,” even if post-Smith the punch that the 
clause packs typically is ineffectual, in the sense that it is much harder to 
use the clause to obtain heightened scrutiny than it was during the second 
era.  It is possible that this breadth of availability (again, tied to a broad 
conception of religion) may—ironically but logically—have been one of 
the reasons for Smith.  The clause may be manageable with either a broad 
definition of religion or a low bar for heightened scrutiny, but not with 
both. 
Let me postulate this as well of the Court’s expansive approach to 
what “religion” means: Much like Sherbert and Yoder, it has less to do 
with a principled and robust theory of religious freedom, and more to do 
with concerns about inclusiveness and autonomy, coupled with a 
modernist or post-modernist crisis in epistemology.  This is a huge 
problem for a robust theory of religious liberty independent of other 
liberties.  If the judiciary is no longer protecting practices because they 
stem from obligations arising from one’s creator, discerned from scripture 
and supported by the teachings of church leaders and theologians, but 
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instead because a claimant simply feels a higher power or inner calling 
(perhaps as much conscience as religion), then the judiciary is not 
operating with a coherent theory of religious freedom but rather just 
deferring to individuals’ idiosyncratic senses of self-realization, 
autonomy, etc.  (Or, as worded in the Planned Parenthood v. Casey joint 
opinion in 1992, the Court is actualizing “the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”44)  This may all seem very cynical, but viewed across multiple 
lines of cases, inferences or conclusions such as these are difficult to avoid.  
But this is to begin to get far afield. 
To return to the state of the law, it will be interesting to see how we 
as a society proceed with both a broad definition of religion (as we have 
had for a while) and broad protection (as with RFRA and RLUIPA we 
have had for only a short time so far).  The early returns are interesting.  
For example, in the case underlying Cutter v. Wilkinson,45 a 2005 Supreme 
Court decision, inmates of an Ohio prison—including adherents of 
Asatru, a minister of the white supremacist Church of Jesus Christ 
Christian, a Wiccan, and a Satanist—challenged the state’s failure to 
make certain accommodations of their non-mainstream religions.  The 
question before the Supreme Court was not the merits of the 
accommodations sought but the state’s argument that, insofar as it 
required such accommodations, RLUIPA violated the Establishment 
Clause—an argument that the Court rejected.  I mentioned something 
about the case’s facts or parties more so that you get a flavor of the sort 
of challenges that are now possible.  The important doctrinal point under 
RFRA is the difference from Smith, and the Court’s decision in 2006 in a 
case called Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal46 
lays plain that difference.  The federal government seized a sacramental 
tea, containing an illegal hallucinogenic substance, from a New Mexico 
branch of a Brazilian church.  The church challenged this in court, and 
the United States Supreme Court ruled for the church.  Unanimously 
adopting a strong reading of RFRA, the Court invalidated the 
government’s application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to the 
hallucinogen at issue.  It refused to accept a generalized compelling 
interest in drug law enforcement and instead required an explanation of 
why enforcement of the specific prohibition against the specific religious 
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group would be compelling.  There being no such explanation, the church 
prevailed. 
But you likely have some sense that we are a long way from Smith.  
For, more recently and more famously, the Court in 2014 decided the 
Hobby Lobby case.47  There the question was whether RFRA enabled 
closely held private corporations (including Hobby Lobby) to claim an 
exemption from federal regulations that implemented the Affordable 
Care Act by requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage 
for various contraceptive methods.  There was no unanimity here.  It was 
a 5-to-4 decision, reflecting a split precisely aligned with the parties of the 
presidents who appointed the members of the Court: the five Republican 
appointees forming the majority and the four Democratic appointees in 
dissent.   
The Court in Hobby Lobby held that RFRA required the government 
to accommodate the interests of a private corporation as employer in not 
providing such insurance coverage.  To listen to the dissent by Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, this was “startling”: “[T]he Court holds that 
commercial enterprises . . . can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) 
they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.”48  We 
need not decide whether the dissent’s characterization of the Court’s 
opinion was exactly correct.  The point to emphasize for us is that the 
decision was based on RFRA.  That was a good thing for the claimants, 
by the way: Given Smith, it would have been much harder to prevail under 
the Free Exercise Clause—to understate the point.  
Hobby Lobby is not the Supreme Court’s latest word on religious 
freedom.  Within the past year, under RLUIPA, the Court decided Holt 
v. Hobbs.49  There it ruled that an Arkansas prison policy preventing a 
Muslim prisoner from growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his 
religious beliefs was unlawful—not unconstitutional, but a violation of 
RLUIPA.  Here the Court was unanimous. 
So where are we?  Well, some things suggest themselves immediately 
from the recent cases—or from Hobby Lobby, at any rate.  One is that 
the extent of religious freedom provided by the federal government is 
scarcely a settled matter.  As with any 5-to-4 decision, we can say that a 
change in one member of the Court might well bring with it a different 
result.  Another is that things are becoming more intense as a political 
matter.  This involves different forms.  They will include the phenomenon 
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of Supreme Court appointments.  But they also include traditional 
politics: the contents of legislation.  The consensus that existed in 
Congress and in the larger public about RFRA is gone.  Earlier this year, 
for example, the ACLU announced that, while it had supported RFRA 
at the time of its passage, “we can no longer support the law in its current 
form.”50  It maintains that RFRA has become not just a shield for 
protecting people “whose religious expression does not harm anyone 
else” but also “a sword to discriminate against women, gay and 
transgender people and others.”51  This will especially be the case, the 
ACLU’s spokesperson maintained, in a world where same-sex marriage 
is a right—and we Americans now live in that world.52  The reaction 
earlier this year to Indiana’s mini-RFRA—a state law largely tracking the 
language of the federal law—can give you some sense of this.53   
To conclude (or to begin to do so), we have established that the 
Supreme Court’s affirmative contribution to the tradition of religious 
freedom in the United States has been modest under the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses.  That is a carefully worded statement.  
There is a robust tradition of religious freedom in this country, and the 
First Amendment has had much to do with it.  But much of that much has 
not been the result of decisions by the Court but rather the good judgment 
of government actors in generally not trying to marry together state and 
church, at least outside the context of public education.  And other parts 
of the robust tradition have come either from state courts and the state 
constitutions or from the United States Supreme Court but in its reading 
of other provisions of the Constitution.  Sometimes those provisions have 
been more general—for example, the Due Process Clause in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters and its antecedent, Meyer v. Nebraska—and other times 
they have included other parts of the First Amendment (as in the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses cases in the 1940s, such as Cantwell, Murdock, and 
Barnette).  Only for about three decades—the second era, from Sherbert 
through Yoder and up until Smith—did the Court apply the Free Exercise 
Clause in a way independently to compel government actors to make 
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exceptions to rules of general applicability such as compulsory-education 
laws. 
And when that happened, it came from individuals, such as Justice 
Brennan, who were also hard at work using some of the same concepts to 
recognize other constitutional rights, such as those in Griswold and Roe.  
And the First Amendment developments would be met with the 
opposition of individuals such as Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia.  All of 
these are careful statements, I hope.  So, for example, Justice Scalia was 
with the majority in Hobby Lobby—but there the issue was one of 
statutory interpretation (RFRA) and not a First Amendment matter.  
One would have to imagine that, if the Court had had to get to the First 
Amendment claims in the case, the principles of Smith would have led 
Justice Scalia in the other direction. 
In short, I think us to have entered into a new era of the law of 
religious freedom in this country—a fourth era.  On the one hand, it 
resembles the second era in terms of its willingness to carve out 
exceptions based on religious grounds to neutral and generally applicable 
government policies.  On the other hand, it is proceeding with a much a 
broader conception of religion than that with which the second era began 
(the Seventh-day Adventists in Sherbert and even the Amish a decade 
later in Yoder were reasonably traditional religions by standards of what 
now falls within the courts’ conception of religion).   
This is going to be a dynamic era.  To give you a sense of it, a 
discussion has recently begun among some intellectuals whether there 
is—under RFRA-type laws—an ability of people to claim an exception to 
anti-assisted-suicide laws on the grounds that it violates their religious 
beliefs to be forbidden to help a patient or a spouse or anyone else to 
escape pain (or what the person feels to be indignity) by helping him end 
his life if he so wants.  For Catholics, this might be an astonishing thing, 
and such an argument was rejected by a court a number of years ago—
but, as one fair-minded and prominent commentator, Eugene Volokh, 
has pointed out, “only because it was brought under the free exercise 
clause, which [under Smith] doesn’t mandate religious objections from 
generally applicable laws.”54  “But what,” this sober commentator asks, 
“of the more than half the states that either have state [RFRAs], or have 
state constitutional religious freedom guarantees that state courts have 
 
54.  Eugene Volokh, Assisted Suicide and Religious Liberty, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/09/28/assisted-suicid
e-and-religious-liberty/ [perma.cc/9NVA-UPHY]. 
 444 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 99:427 
interpreted as generally providing religious exemptions?”55  Rather than 
analyze a possible RFRA right to help with assisted suicide, let me 
conclude this point with the commentator’s observation: “A complicated 
question, which I expect that courts might well be turning to soon, 
especially given the extra publicity and credibility given to religious 
objection claims by recent cases such as Hobby Lobby.”56   
Let me take a few minutes to conclude more broadly as well.  To do 
this, let me note something about what judges do.  Yes, in the context of 
specific cases, they interpret the Constitution and statutes, but in doing 
this they never get away from their education in the common law, which 
involves grappling with concepts such as “reasonableness.”  And what 
does this involve—or, at any rate, where do judges get the notions and 
precepts underlying this grappling?  They get it, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., instructed us in the late nineteenth century, not so much from “logic” 
as from “experience.”57  This is relevant here because there will be much 
common-law reasoning in applying RFRA, as judges determine whether 
a government obligation “substantially burden[s] a person’s exercise of 
religion” and, if so, whether it is in “furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest.”  There will, in other words, be much occasion for 
exercising judgment.  That is what judges do, for better or for worse, and 
they will be influenced, as judges with discretion always have been, less 
by the “syllogism” (or logic) and more by “experience”—or, to complete 
the quote from Holmes, by “[t]he felt necessities of the time, the 
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed 
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men [and women, we might add].”58   
So, without doubt, we must hope for good judgment.  At the same 
time, the last word here should not be from Holmes or RFRA but from a 
source both less and more authoritative.  Consider that a broad theme of 
my lecture has been that people are wrong to think that the Supreme 
Court has protected religious liberty for the past two centuries.  In fact, it 
has done rather little in that regard—and even less by way of protecting 
religious liberty separate and apart from “liberty” more generally.  And 
so, in closing this Pallium Lecture, I am reminded of the wisdom of Psalm 
146: “Put not your trust in princes . . . .”59   
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“Put not your trust in princes.”  I confess that the admonition is taken 
out of context, but is this not the right attitude for citizens of a democracy 
to cultivate?  Princes in black robes are no more to be trusted to protect 
our freedoms than are any others.  In the end, it is only the hard work of 
influencing elected representatives to pass laws (such as RFRA, perhaps) 
and of electing executives who truly cherish religious liberty themselves 
that will give its proponents a fighting chance. 
I thank Archbishop Listecki for his confidence in inviting me to 
deliver this year’s Pallium Lecture.  And I thank all of you for your kind 
attention to the lecture.  I hope that you have found something of value 
in it. 
 
